Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia: A Fifty Year Old Policeman and Traditional Equal Protection Analysis: Are They Both Past Their Prime? by Evans, William David
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 7
4-15-1977
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia: A
Fifty Year Old Policeman and Traditional Equal
Protection Analysis: Are They Both Past Their
Prime?
William David Evans
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
William David Evans Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia: A Fifty Year Old Policeman and Traditional Equal Protection Analysis:
Are They Both Past Their Prime?, 4 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1977)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/7
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia:
A Fifty Year Old Policeman and Traditional
Equal Protection Analysis: Are They
Both Past Their Prime?
INTRODUCTION
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia' the United
States Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which
held a mandatory retirement statute unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause.2
Lt. Colonel Robert D. Murgia was retired from the Uniformed
Branch of the Massachusetts State Police pursuant to a Mas-
sachusetts statute which requires state police officers with
twenty years of service to be retired upon reaching the age of
fifty.3 Officer Murgia was in excellent physical and mental
health and had recently passed the rigorous annual physical
examination required of all officers beyond forty years of age.
There is no dispute that when he was retired his excellent health
still rendered him capable of performing the duties of a un-
iformed officer.4
1. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
2. Murgia v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass.
1974).
3. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 32, 1, 32 (g), 26 (3) (a) (1932); provides in
pertinent part:
"a)... Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter twenty-two
... who has performed service in the division of state police in the department
of public safety for not less than twenty years, shall be retired upon his attaining
age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, whichever last occurs."
4. 427 U.S. 307, 311 (1976).
Murgia in the District Court
In the District Court officer Murgia presented an equal pro-
tection argument against the validity of the statute. Under tradi-
tional analysis two levels of judicial review are utilized. One
level of review is extremely deferential to the legislature and its
perceived intent in enacting the statute. The other is quite strin-
gent and requires a high degree of congruence between the
statutory classification and the purpose to be achieved.'
Murgia initially argued that a classification based solely on
age was entitled to the higher level of review. Alternatively, he
argued that even if the lesser standard of analysis was appropri-
ate the statute was not rationally related to the purpose it was
intended to serve. Thus, it did not afford officer Murgia the
equal protection of the law.
6
Because the statute interferred with important aspects of life
(Murgia claimed a fundamental right to work) the complaint
asserted that the statute should be upheld only upon a showing
by the state that it had a compelling interest in maintaining the
effecting law. A claim that the statute created an irrebuttable
presumption and took away Murgia's employment without due
process of law was raised in the lower court but abandoned on
appeal to the Supreme Court.
The District Court reached only one issue: whether a classifi-
cation based on age fifty alone is devoid of a rational basis in the
furtherance of any substantial state interest. Relying upon Reed
v. Reed7 and Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia8 the court declared
that the statute was unconstitutional. The court stated:
On this record we find that mandatory retirement at age 50, where
individualized medical screening is not only available, but already
required, is no more rational, and no more related to a protectable
state interest .... Recognizing the public interest in protecting the
individual's right to work, and against discrimination on account of
5. The traditional "two-tier" system of equal protection analysis applies a
test of mere rationality to those classifications which are not deemed to be
"suspect" or those rights which are not "fundamental." A statutory classifica-
tion is justifiable so long as it bears some rational relationship to the intended
purpose of the legislation.
If a suspect classification or a fundamental interest is involved a much more
intense level of judicial review, known as "strict scrutiny," is afforded. A "com-
pelling state interest" must be served by the statutory classification if the statute
is to be upheld. See, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
For those classifications which have been deemed suspect and rights which
have been considered fundamental, see note 12, infra.
6. See note 5, supra.
7. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
8. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
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age . . . we are compelled to strike down the present age distinction
where plaintiff has established the absence of any factual basis there-
for.9
The statute was declared void and the court was willing to
award appropriate mandatory relief after a hearing was had
regarding officer Murgia's capabilities. 10
Murgia in the United States Supreme Court
In reversing the District Court, the United States Supreme
Court agreed that rationality was the proper standard by which
to test whether compulsory retirement at age fifty violates equal
protection requirements.1 The Court did not agree, however,
that the classification based upon age fifty was not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.
The Supreme Court did not subject the statute to a strict
scrutiny analysis in determining its validity for, according to the
Court, equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a
legislative classification only when the classification impermiss-
ibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or oper-
ates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. 2
The Court summarily dismissed the notion that the right to
work is fundamental (and thus entitled to strict scrutiny) by
simply stating that its decisions have given no support to this
proposition: ". . . we have expressed that a standard less than
strict scrutiny has consistently been applied to state legislation
restricting the availability of employment opportunities."'' 3
The classification of uniformed state police officers by age
was not found to be suspect. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez defined a suspect class as one "saddled
9. 376 F. Supp. 753, 756 (1974).
10. Id.
11. 427 U.S. at 312.
12. Id. Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973).
Fundamental rights include the rights to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); to travel interstate,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and to rights guaranteed by First
Amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
Suspect classifications include race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and ancestry, Oya-
ma v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See note 5, supra.
13. 427 U.S. at 312.
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.' 1 4 The Murgia court
stated:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not wholly been
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike say, those who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not
experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics
not truly indicative of their abilities. The class ... cannot be said to
discriminate against the elderly. Rather it draws a line at a certain age
in middle life.15
Old age was described as merely a stage in life that everyone
who lives out his normal span of years will reach. 16 Because of
this the classification based upon age was held not to be entitled
to strict scrutiny even if the statute could be construed as
penalizing those officers over fifty. The classification did not
impose a distinction sufficiently similar to those which had been
found suspect in the past. 7
Because neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental
right was involved the traditional rational basis test, the test
which exhibits extreme deference to the legislature and re-
quires only that a statute be reasonably related to a legitimate
state purpose, 8 was deemed appropriate.
Referring to the examination of the statutory classification
under the rational basis test the Court stated that
This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the
Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task ... Perfection in making the necessary
classifications is neither possible nor necessary. Such action by a
legislature is presumed to be valid.' 9
Because the stated purpose of the statute was to provide
vigorous, youthful policemen, the Court readily accepted it as a
14. 411 U.S. at 28.
15. 427 U.S. at 313.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) contains an excellent passage
which describes the passive nature of this "lower-level" test:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the states a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens diffe-
rently than others. The Constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the state's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that in practice, their
laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425, 426.
19. 427 U.S. at 314.
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legitimate exercise of the legislature's power. The fact that the
State did not choose to determine fitness more precisely
through individualized testing did not affect the legislative ob-
jective of assuring physical fitness; it only suggested that the
State might not have chosen the best method of determining
fitness.20 Because the statute was not wholly irrelevant to the
objective the classification did not constitute an equal protec-
tion violation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. 21
The Significance of Murgia: Immediate and Prospective
The immediate effect of Murgia was to dispel the hopes of
those who thought the Supreme Court would strike down a
mandatory retirement statute if one was considered on its
merits.
22
The Court's refusal to recognize age as a suspect classification
or the right to work as fundamental precludes the strict scrutiny
analysis of mandatory retirement statutes.23 The most reason-
able approach would have been that applied by the District
Court. It is a middle level test which is referred to as "minimal
scrutiny with bite" test by Professor Gunther.24 The rejection of
20. Id. at 316. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). When
rationality is the test, a State "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."
21. 427 U.S. at 317.
22. The question presented in Murgia had been summarily treated in previ-
ous cases. See e.g., Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975) aff'g 383 F. Supp. 933 (D
C 1974); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), dismissing appeal from
454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973); Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F. 2d 892 (2d
Cir. 1960); cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
At least one federal court, Gault v. Garrison, 523 F. 2d 205 (1975), indicated its
willingness to hold a mandatory retirement statute unconstitutional but that
court felt bound by the Supreme Court's dismissal of McIlvaine v. Pennsyl-
vania, supra:
Our conclusion must be that if we were to decide this appeal today,
we would be constrained to honor the aforementioned Supreme Court
summary judgment dispositions as being persuasive precedents if not
binding .... In view of the foregoing, we believe that the only just
course is to stay a final decision until the Supreme Court decides
Murgia.
523 F. 2d 205, 209 (1975).
For an excellent discussion of possible challenges to a mandatory retirement
statute see Larkin, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A Re-
consideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 549 (1975). [hereinafter cited as Mandatory
Retirement].
23. See note 5, supra.
24. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Following the nomenclature of Gunther, the two
373
this approach by the Murgia Court reflects the erratic behavior
of the Court in its analyses of equal protection problems involv-
ing less than previously recognized fundamental rights or sus-
pect classifications.
This Note will examine the various approaches to less than
high level equal protection analysis which have been employed
by the Court in recent years.
A Middle Level of Equal Protection Analysis:
Pick a test, any test
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Murgia, expressed his belief
that the two-tier system of review should be abandoned and a
"sliding-scale" model be utilized whereby a level of review com-
mensurate with the interest involved would be afforded.2" Al-
though other members of the Court have not embraced his
model,2 6 it's appropriate to examine the discontent which the
Court has sporadically manifested with regard to the rigid two-
tiered method of review.
Two similar methods of analysis have been periodically em-
braced by a majority of the Court in an effort to utilize a middle-
level test. These are the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine
and the aforementioned "minimal scrutiny with bite" approach.
The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine: Equal Protection
in Due Process Clothing
One mode of statutory analysis which has been utilized by the
Court to protect individuals against imprecise statutory classifi-
cations is the irrebuttable presumption doctrine .2 The doctrine
standards of analysis will be denominated "minimum scrutiny" and "strict
scrutiny." Id. at 1-8. "Rational basis" will be used interchangeably with
"minimum scrutiny."
25. 427 U.S. at 318.
26. Justice Marshall's .position was stated most elaborately in his dissenting
opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70
(1973):
In summary it seems ... inescapably clear that this Court has con-
sistently adjusted the care with which it will review a state discrimina-
tion in light of the Constitutional significance and the invidiousness of
the particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we
find the discriminatory state action is almost always sustained, for
such interests are generally far removed from Constitutional guaran-
tees .... But the situation differs markedly when discrimination
against important individual interests with constitutional implications
and against a particularly disadvantaged or powerless class is in-
volved. Id. at 109.
27. Legislation creates an irrebuttable presumption when it provides that
fact A (the basic fact) is conclusive evidence of the existence of fact B (the
presumed fact). See 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence: 1353 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972); Note,
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was introduced in the 1920's and 1930's and was used by the
Court to strike down offending tax law classifications.28 As the
doctrine was based upon due process concepts it fell into dis-
favor in the post-1937 period which marked the decline of sub-
stantive due process and did not reappear until 1965.
Several recent cases have utilized the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine to reach an issue which might just as easily (and
more appropriately) have been reached on equal protection
grounds.29 In these cases the Court has held that, if it is not
"necessarily or universally true in fact" that the basic fact im-
plies the presumed fact, then the statute's irrebuttable presump-
tion denies due process of law. 30 The usual remedy in such a
case is an individualized hearing to determine whether the stat-
utory classification accurately reflects the legislative purpose
when applied to the particular factual situation with which the
Court is confronted.31
The requirement of a classification which is "universally true
in fact" marks a significant and beneficial difference between a
statutory attack based upon irrebuttable presumption grounds
and one advancing an equal protection argument. The tradition-
al rational basis test requires only that a legislative classifica-
tion be rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate state
objective.32 If the classification does not touch upon one of the
criteria necessary to invoke strict scrutiny analysis, the ex-
The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1534 (1974). [hereinafter cited as Presumptions].
The effect of a statutory classification based upon an irrebuttable
presumption is to make fact B irrelevant in the determination of the
propriety of a persons being included in the class. Once a person is
found to be includable within the prerequisites of fact A, proof of the
non-applicability of presumed fact B is inadmissible. 9 J. Wigmore,
Evidence: 2492 (3d Ed. 1940).
28. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284
U.S. 206 (1931); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). In Schlesinger the
Court found unconstitutional a Wisconsin tax statute which deemed that any
gift made within six (6) years of death was made for the purpose of avoiding
estate taxation. An irrebuttable presumption was created because evidence was
inadmissible to prove that the gift was not made for tax purposes.
29. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Clandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
30. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See Presumptions, note 27,
supra.
31. Id. at 445-46; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
32. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See note 18, supra.
tremely deferrential nature of the traditional rational basis test
will almost certainly result in a denial of relief.3
3
If the argument is framed as an irrebuttable presumption-
denial of due process argument, an inability to rebut the pre-
sumed incompetency of the individual will, under the Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur34 line of cases, cause the Court
to reverse and remand with instructions to provide an individu-
alized hearing to determine the individual capabilities of the
contestant.
In LaFleur the Court invalidated a regulation of the Cleve-
land Board of Education which required pregnant teachers to
take a mandatory pregnancy leave of absence after the fifth
month of pregnancy. The Board attempted to justify the re-
quirement as a means of promoting both the assurance of physi-
cally capable instructors and administrative efficiency. The
Court found that the refusal to hear medical testimony with
regard to petitioner's physical condition created an irrebuttable
presumption and ordered a hearing. Administrative conveni-
ence was determined to be an inadequate justification for the
requirement as it interfered with important personal rights of
the petitioner.
35
It is obvious that the factual situation in LaFleur is quite
similar to that in Murgia. The classification of officer Murgia as
an officer fifty years old raised the irrebuttable presumption
that he was incompetent to perform his duties. The issue did not
reach the Supreme Court in Murgia because it was abandoned
on appeal, 36 perhaps because it was perceived that the Court
was unwilling to entertain such an argument.
The availability of individualized hearings (the result of suc-
cessful irrebuttable presumption arguments) is both the bles-
sing and the curse of the doctrine. Although the hearings are
advantageous to individual contestants, the doctrine neverthe-
less allows for the convenient circumvention of true equal pro-
33. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), is a rare exception to this general
rule. In Morey a statute was struck down due to the absence of any rational
relationship between the classification and the statute's purpose.
34. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See note
29, supra.
35. Id. at 640, 643.
36. Brief for Appellee at 41-45, Massachusetts Board of Retriement v. Mur-
gia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
It is interesting that Ms. Larkin anticipated the irrebuttable presumption
challenged and predicted its failure due to the Court's rejection of the doctrine
in Salfi. See, Mandatory Retirement, note 22, supra at 568. Unfortunately,
Murgia's abandonment precluded the awaited confrontation.
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tection issues. The concurring opinion of Justice Powel137 and
the dissent of Justice Rehnquist 38 in LaFleur emphasize this
point.39 Justice Powell stated:
It seems to me that equal protection analysis is the appropriate
frame of reference . . . As a matter of logic, it is difficult to see the
terminus of the road upon which the Court has embarked under the
banner 'irrebuttable presumption' . . If the Court nevertheless used
'irrebuttable presumption' reasoning selectively, the concept at root
often will be something else masquerading as a due process doctrine.
That something else is the Equal Protection Clause.
40
Justice Rehnquist stated that nearly all statutory classifications
may be restated as irrebuttable presumptions.
The use of the doctrine to circumvent equal protection issues
was recognized by the majority opinion in Weinberger v. Salfi.41
In Salfi the Court refused to apply the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine to a nine-month duration of marriage requirement
of the Social Security Act.42 The opinion indicated that the stat-
utes in Vlandis, LaFleur and Stanley would have been uncon-
stitutional on equal protection grounds:43
We think that the District Court's extension of the holdings of Stan-
ley, Vlandis, and LaFleur, to the eligibility issue here would turn the
doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for count-
less legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly
consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution. The benefits here are available upon compliance with an
objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a
sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used
as a test of eligibility.
44 ,
Perhaps Salfi rejected the doctrine because of the unwilling-
ness of the Court to order a rehearing at the lower court which
would have had to attempt to discern the intention of the wel-
fare claimant.
45
37. 414, U.S. 632, 651 (1974).
38. Id. at 654.
39. Chief Justice Burger and Juctice Rehnquist dissented in LaFleur and
in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Justice Powell concurred only in the
result in LaFleur.
40. 414 U.S. at 651.
41. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
42. 42 U.S.C. 416(c)(5) and (E)(2) (1970 ed. and Supp. III).
43. 422 U.S. at 771-72.
44. Id. Salfi has been followed in Matthews, Secretary of Heath, Educa-
tion, and Welfare v. Cintron, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), which summarily reversed and
remanded an unreported district court class action decision.
45. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). The purpose of the nine month duration of marriage
In comparison, the factual situations in the other irrebuttable
presumption cases were susceptible to objective evaluations. 46
The Court may still accept the doctrine in a case whose facts are
susceptible to an evaluation upon rehearing. However, the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine is nothing more than a means
of avoiding that which should be confronted.
Minimal Scrutiny With Bite
Accompanying changes in the membership of the Supreme
Court during the late 1960's and early 1970's have been certain
instances of substantial change in the lower level method of
traditional equal protection analysis. 47 The "newer" rational
basis test, which has been utilized most consistently in gender-
based discrimination cases, has been labeled "minimal scrutiny
with bite" because it requires a "fair and substantial relation-
ship between the means chosen to effectuate the legislative pur-
pose and the objective itself.4 8
There are two significant advantages available to the contes-
tant who is able to persuade the Court to invoke this level of
review. First, the Court will restrict itself to the object of the
legislation.49 This curbs the ability of the Court to speculate as to
an acceptable reason for the classification.
The second significant advantage of the middle level test is
that the Court will then be unwilling to recognize "administra-
tive convenience" as a legitimate objective of the statute:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of a hear-
ing on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.50
When the Court's unwillingness to hypothesize a legitimate
purpose is combined with the state's inability to assert adminis-
trative convenience as a valid reason for the discriminatory
classification it is obvious that a statute may fail the test. This is
requirement was stated to be to deter fraudulent claims of marriage made to
obtain widow's benefits.
46. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), for
example, the purpose of the mandatory pregnancy leave was to insure physical-
ly fit teachers. Physical fitness may be readily ascertained by medical reports.
47. See Gunther, p. 18-20, note 24, supra.
48. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), Cf. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Reed states: "A classification must be reasonable not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference. . . so that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike."
49. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court's willingness to
uphold a statute on hypothetical grounds is a permissible part of traditional
lower-level review.
50. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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especially true in a case such as Murgia in which the statute was
designed to ensure the availability of physically fit policemen.
The existence of a rigorous physical examination as a readily
available means of providing individual evaluation would add
to the weight against the statute which classified solely on the
basis of age.
The District Court invalidated the statute in Murgia by apply-
ing the middle level "minimal scrutiny with bite" test.51 How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not accept this approach and used
a less stringent level of review. Although both Courts claimed to
be using the rational basis or "minimal scrutiny" test, the results
were diametrically opposed. Different conclusions were
reached because the district court, which purportedly applied
the rational basis test, actually employed a higher level of re-
view.
It is very difficult to speculate when the Court will utilize the
middle level test in its more stringent form. The majority of
cases in which it has been used have been gender-based classifi-
cations or those containing interferences with rights which were
"close" to being fundamental. 52
The confusion created by the Court's inconsistent use of this
test is manifest in the Murgia decision. Classifications based
upon age, although they have never been held to be suspect,
may be analogized to classifications based upon sex (those have
most consistently received "minimal scrutiny with bite" review).
Both age and sex may be characterized as "immutable traits
often unrelated to one's ability to perform a given task. '53 Of-
ficer Robert Murgia was as physically and mentally capable as a
younger man. This was verified by his physical examination.
Yet, because of his age, he was classified as unfit and was forced
to retire. The classification based upon age was thus wholly
unrelated to his ability to perform.
51. Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (1974).
52. Stantion v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) are examples of the use of the
"minimal scrutiny with bite" mode of analysis to strike down classification. In
Frontiero a plurality of the Justices elevated sex to a suspect class.
In James v. Stranges, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), the test was used to invalidated a
Kansas recoupment law which denied indigent criminal defendants rights af-
forded civil judgment debtors, i.e., exemption of personal necessities. The most
probable explanation is that this right was sufficiently "fundamental" to justify
the use of the rational basis test "with bite."
53. Frontiero v. Ricnardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
Even if one acquiesces in the Court's rejection of the age-
based contention, the right to work is certainly one which is
"sufficiently close" to being a fundamental right and any statute
interfering with such an interest should invoke a higher stan-
dard of review.
The right to work has been declared to be fundamental by the
Supreme Court in two early cases 54 and is protected by the
"liberty" and "property" concepts of due process. 5  It has also
been deemed fundamental by the California Supreme Court 6
which held that interferences with or limitations upon this right
may be countenanced only after the most careful judicial
scrutiny.57
California's position that one's interest in employment is fun-
damental was reiterated in Townsend v. City of Los Angeles.5 8
In Townsend a mandatory retirement statute was upheld
against a "right to work" challenge. The essential holding was
that, although the right to work is fundamental, a person's right
to work for a particular employer is not. As long as the statute in
question is not arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable it will
be upheld.59
Although Townsend may appear to mark a retreat from the
position established by Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,60 the signifi-
cance of the former decision lies in the weight accorded the
right to work by the California court. The requirement of
"reasonableness" is similarly emphasized and is applicable re-
gardless of whether the traditional or the "newer" equal protec-
tion analysis is employed. The difference between the analyses
is in the lengths to which the court will go to determine whether
a classification is "reasonable."
Because of the quasi-fundamental nature of the right to work
and the similarity of age and sex classifications as being "close"
to suspect, one would have expected the Murgia Court to sub-
ject the statute to "minimal scrutiny with bite" as was done in
54. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Smith v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
Truax states: "It requires no argument that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the (14th) Amendment to
secure." Id. at 41. See Mandatory Retirement, note 22, supra, at 558.
55. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1958).
56. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P. 2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971).
57. Id.
58. 49 Cal. App. 3d 263, 122 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975).
59. Id.
60. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P. 2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
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the district court. However, recent decisions indicate that the
use of this test is not assured even in gender-based cases.
In Kahn v. Shevin61 and in Geduldig v. Aiello 62 the Court
upheld statutes which involved sex classifications. Kahn may
perhaps be distinguished as a benign classification established
to redress prior discriminations. 3 The Kahn Court at least
quoted the "fair and substantial relationship" language of the
middle level test.6 4 Geduldig, however, upheld a California sta-
tute which provided disability benefits for victims of prostec-
tomies, sickle-cell anemia and other male and race-related dis-
orders but excluded coverage for normal pregnancy.65 In doing
so the Court reverted to the deferential language of traditional
rational basis analysis. 66
Stanton v. Stanton marked the return of minimal scrutiny
with bite.67 In this case (which followed Reed v. Reed 6 8) the
Court struck down a statute which provided for the support of
female children until their eighteenth birthday but which con-
tinued support for males until the age of twenty-one.69 The opin-
ion acknowledged the existence of a middle level of scrutiny by
stating: "We therefore conclude that under any test, compelling
state interest, or rational basis, or something in between ... [the
statute] does not survive an equal protection attack. ' 70
61. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
62. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
63. 416 U.S. at 355. Kahn involved a challenge by a widower who claimed
entitlement to the five hundred dollar property tax exemption which was cus-
tomarily granted to widows. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, recog-
nized that a widow generally encounters more substantial financial barriers
than a widower. He also observed that the statute sought to compensate or
rectify past discriminations against women. Id.
64. Id. at 76.
65. 417 U.S. at 500. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 2626, 2626.2 (West 1974).
66. Id. at 496 Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
67. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
68. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69. UTAH CODE ANN. 15-2-1 (1953). As in previous cases the Court did not
find the required fair and substantial relationship between the statute and its
stated purpose (to provide additional support for the male child's education and
training to assume his role as head of the household).
70. 421 U.S. at 17.
The Articulated Purpose Test
An examination of several recent decisions which purported-
ly applied the traditional rational basis test reveals that the
Court has accorded three levels of review to similar statutes.
These statutes pertain to other than gender-based classifica-
tions which, of course, are most likely to receive middle level
analysis in the form of "minimal scrutiny with bite." The cases
are of the variety long associated with the lower level of review.
Although one line of cases adheres to the traditional form of
analysis, the other two reveal a marked narrowing of the
Court's willingness to go beyond the legislative history in search
of support for the classification. These two modes of analysis
differ in degree: one accepts the reasons advanced by the legis-
lative history at "face value" while the other proceeds to test the
reasonableness of the classification in relation to its legislative
history.
In the line of cases represented by Dandridge v. Williams7'
the traditional rational basis test is manifested in its classical
form of extreme deference to the legislature. Dandridge in-
volved a challenge to a Maryland welfare provision which
placed a ceiling on the amount of benefits receivable by any one
family. The contention was that this provision invidiously dis-
criminated against later-born children of large families and de-
nied them the equal protection of the laws.72 The scheme of
distribution was upheld because there was a rational relation-
ship between the statute and the objective of encouraging em-
ployment which it was designed to advance. As the regulation
could be clearly justified on the grounds advanced in Mary-
land's argument7 3 the maximum grant regulation was upheld.
The significance of the Dandridge cases is that the validity of
the statute's purpose was never really considered. These cases
suggest that the legislation will be accepted as valid if any
reason is or can be advanced to support the challenged classifi-
cation. Perhaps the best example of traditional analysis lan-
guage and application in this context is found in Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 74:
71. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For convenience the following cases will be referred
to as the "Dandridge line": Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S. Ct. 2882
(1976); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Usery, supra, is a Fifth
Amendment Due Process case. However, the two-tier mode of analysis is the
same as that employed in Fourteenth Amendment cases.
72. Id. at 476-77.
73. Id. at 483. "The regulation can be clearly justified, Maryland argues, in
terms of legitimate state interest in encouraging gainful employment."
74. 96 S. Ct. 2882 (1976).
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We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme
... it is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem ...
rationally; whether a broader . . .scheme would have been wiser or
more practical under the circumstances is not a question of constitu-
tional dimension. 75
A variation of the traditional test is represented by Mas-
sachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia and by other recent
decisions.7 6 These decisions test the validity of statutes by look-
ing to their legislative histories. If it is determined that Congress
could have rationally concluded that a legitimate state interest
would be served by a particular classification, the statute will be
upheld. In upholding the statute in Murgia the Court set forth
excerpts of state legislative commission reports which stressed
the desirability of youthful, vigorous policemen.7 7 The age clas-
sification was held to be "clearly rationally related to the State's
objective. '78
Although the Court remains passive in this line of cases it
does not appear as willing to hypothesize legitimate purposes
for the statutes. The sole requirement for validation seems to be
some legislative history upon which the Court may rely. In
Weinberger v. Salfi79 the legislative history was reviewed and
the Court concluded that
While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding legitimate
claimants ... and of relying on a rule which may not exclude some
obviously sham arrangements, we think it clear that Congress could
rationally choose to adopt such a course.
80
Hypothesizing is thus left to Congress. These cases are a step
away from the extreme deference of Dandridge but they still do
not provide any real judicial review of the challenged legisla-
tion. They merely represent a convenient means of "rubber-
stamping" legislative intent. Perhaps this approach is best
characterized as an "articulated purpose acceptance."
75. Id. at 2894.
76. 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). These cases shall be referred to as the Murgia line of
cases.
77. Id. at 314-16.
78. Id.
79. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Salfi, which rejected the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine, dealt with a social security requirement that a marriage last nine
months or more before the survivor (widow) could claim widow's benefits. See
note 45, supra.
80. Id. at 781.
However, a third line of cases represented by U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno81 reveals a strengthened form of the
traditional rational basis test. In Moreno the Court refused to
accept the legislative history of the enactment as a legitimate
purpose. Further, an alternate reason for justifying the classifi-
cation was rejected by the Court; it instead chose to evaluate the
legislation solely on the reasonableness of its articulated pur-
pose. The level of review found in Moreno is not of the rubber-
stamp variety typical of Murgia-like decisions nor does it ap-
proximate the passive deference of Dandridge.82 The legislative
history was carefully evaluated and was, in fact, responsible for
the invalidation of the legislation. The Court stated:
The challenged statutory classification is clearly irrelevant to the
stated purpose of the Act .... Thus, if it is to be sustained, the
challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate gov-
ernmental interest .... [R]egrettably ... the legislative history that
does exist, indicates that ... the challenged classification clearly can-
not be sustained by reference to this Congressional purpose.
83
This "articulated purpose test" has also been used by the
Court to uphold legislation. In Johnson v. Robison the Court
held that a classification which excluded those who had per-
formed alternative civilian service in lieu of military duty was
not violative of equal protection requirements. 84 The legislative
history was thoroughly scrutinized and the classification was
found to bear a reasonable relationship to the stated purpose of
providing educational benefits to those who had been subjected
to the hardships of military service.85
But the fact that Congress could conclude that a reasonable
relationship did exist between a particular classification and
that statute's purposes is not decisive. In the Murgia line of
cases this would be a sufficient reason to uphold the classifica-
tion. However, the Moreno cases, which employ an articulated
purpose analysis, reflect the Court's assumption of an affirma-
tive role in the judicial review process in which the stated pur-
pose of the legislation is evaluated in light of the surrounding
circumstances. The test is not whether Congress could have
concluded that a statute is reasonable. The articulated purpose
test requires that a statutory classification be reasonable in fact.
81. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974);
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 176
(1974).
82. 397 U.S. at 486. In Dandridge the Court states: "We need not explore all
the reasons that the State advances in justification of the regulation."
83. 413 U.S. at 534.
84. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
85. Id. at 378-82.
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It is difficult to advance more than a guess as to what moti-
vates the Court to apply the intensified, Moreno-type analysis.
Perhaps the nature of petitioner's claim spurs this actual test of
legislative history. For example, in Dandridge, the purpose ad-
vanced in support of the classification was "the state's legiti-
mate interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding dis-
crimination between welfare families and the families of the
working poor. '8 6 Subjectively, the state's desire to place welfare
recipients and workers on an equal plane "makes sense." It is
possible that the Court, for this reason, deemed it unnecessary
to go further in determining the propriety of the classification.
In Murgia, the classification which forced the retirement of
officers beyond age fifty was plausible, yet Murgia's fitness was
indicative of the statute's imperfection. Although a statutory
classification need not be perfect 87 the fact that some officers
would be wrongfully retired was, perhaps, responsible for the
Court's limited review of the legislative history. The Court may
have wished to convince itself that most officers over fifty are
incapable of performing their required duties. Physicians' tes-
timony to that effect contained in the legislative history did
satisfy the Court and it upheld the statute.
By comparison, Dandridge involved a classification which
could be deemed reasonable (or not) through a subjective deter-
mination of the classification's rationality. The limitation on
welfare receipts designed to place the recipient and the working
poor on the same level is in accord with a "rough justice" sense
of equality and basic fairness. Murgia, however, involved a
classification and stated a purpose amenable to statistical
analysis. Why was age fifty chosen? Wasn't forty-five equally
appropriate? Reasonableness in Murgia could best be deter-
mined by examining the history of the act and by reviewing the
physicians' testimony. The fact situation in Murgia called upon
the Court to assume a more active role in the analysis.
In Moreno, the Court's active analysis may again be explained
by the reason advanced in support of the classification. The
legislative history of the statute (which refused foodstamps to
"unrelated houses") indicated a desire on the part of the state to
86. 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
87. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
keep "hippies" from receiving foodstamps. In Murgia and in
Dandridge the legislation was proposed to effectuate purposes
which were "acceptable" to the normal man. The purpose in
Moreno, however, may have been patently offensive to the
Court. No reason for the classification, other than "anti-hippie"
animus, was revealed by the legislative history. Perhaps this so
offended or seemed so unreasonable and discriminatory to the
Court that it refused to accept the purpose subsequently ad-
vanced (i.e., to prevent fraud).
In Johnson v. Robison88 the Court reviewed a classification
which denied government insurance benefits to conscientious
objectors who chose to perform alternate service. Although the
statute was upheld, the purposes revealed by the legislative
history and offered in support of the classification were strin-
gently tested. Again, this may have been due to the fact that
both military draftees and those choosing alternate service were
required to sacrifice the same amount of time and make similar
changes in their lifestyles. Thus, no plausible reason for the
denial of benefits could be deemed rational solely on the basis of
''common sense."
An awareness of the Court's three different approaches in
this area may be beneficial in determining how one should pre-
sent arguments of this nature to the Court. If the legislative
history in support of a classification is strong and seems condu-
cive to a "legitimate" purpose, the petitioner may be secure in
framing an argument based upon that history. However, if the
legislative history is sparse, or if the reason for the classification
is not readily apparent or is unacceptable without explanation,
the petitioner may be well advised to advance several reasons in
support of the statute and allow the Court to choose an appro-
priate purpose by way of a Dandridge-type analysis. The more
specific one's supporting reasons are, the more assertive the
Court will become in its analysis.
CONCLUSION
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine, minimal scrutiny with
bite and the three levels of rational basis analysis (in other than
gender-related cases) would represent an ideal continum of the
emerging strength in lower level equal protection analysis. Un-
fortunately, all of these approaches have been utilized contem-
poraneously. All have been used, have been rejected and have
somehow re-emerged. Contrasting the various approaches reve-
als the fragmented nature of the lower level test.
88. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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If the Court continues to pay lip service to the two-tier system
of review, and Murgia indicates that it will, the situation will
remain the same. However, it is likely that the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine will fall into disuse. It has been recognized as
a "back-door" approach to equal protection analysis, and its use
should not be advocated. It is preferable instead to force the
Court to resolve the chaotic state of lower level analysis. Hope-
fully, the line of cases represented by Murgia foreshadow the
Court's permanent departure from the extreme deference as-
sociated with the traditional test.
The most interesting development is revealed by comparing
Moreno 9 and Robison9" with the gender-based cases which
have invoked the enhanced level of analysis. 91 Although the
non-gender-based cases purport to be utilizing the traditional
rational basis method of review, they seem to be extending the
"minimal scrutiny with bite" test to the area of economic and
social benefits. Perhaps the relatively settled application of the
rational basis test "with bite" in gender-based cases, combined
with the sporadic elevation of review levels in other areas and
with the Court's reluctance to go outside the stated purposes of
the statute in yet other cases (i.e. Murgia) indicates a permanent
strengthening of the traditional basis tests' application, if not in
form.
WILLIAM DAVID EVANS
89. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
90. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
91. See note 49, supra. Compare the language and analysis in Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) with Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a
gender-based case in which the Court states:
"A statute reasonably designed to further the state policy ... can
survive an equal protection attack .... [B]ut the mere recitation of a
benign compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which pro-
tects any inquiry into the actual purpose underlying a statutory
scheme." Id. at 648.

